Předmět Game Theory and Political Economy (JEB064)

Na serveru studentino.cz naleznete nejrůznější studijní materiály: zápisky z přednášek nebo cvičení, vzorové testy, seminární práce, domácí úkoly a další z předmětu JEB064 - Game Theory and Political Economy, Fakulta sociálních věd, Univerzita Karlova v Praze (UK).

Materiál	Typ	Datum	Počet stažení

Sylabus

Voting. Condorcet winner. The non-existence of Condorcet winner. Spatial preferences. Euclidean preferences. Median bliss point. McKelvey Theorem. Majority and supramajority voting for spatial preferences. Alternative voting systems. Neutral Condorcet and neutral reversal requirements. Strategic voting. Killer amendments. Dictatorial voting system. Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem. Pairwise (simple majority) voting on tax and transfers: Can we explain cross-country differences in redistribution? Does larger inequality imply larger redistribution?*** McCarty, Meirowitz (2007) Ch. 2.4-2.5, 4, 5.1-5.3** Grossman, Helpman (2001) Ch. 2.1-2.2* Mueller (2003) Ch. 5.2--5.8, 5.13* Alesina, A., Angletos, G.-M. (2005) Fairness and Redistribution, American Economic Review 95 (4), 960-980.* Saari, D. (2006) A Tool Kit for Voting Theory, Handbook, Ch. 22Glaeser, E.L. (2006) Inequality, Handbook, Ch. 34Londegran, J. (2006) Political Income Redistribution, Handbook, Ch. 5Milanovic, B. (2000). The median-voter hypothesis, income inequality, and income redistribution: an empirical test with the required data, European Journal of Political Economy, 16, 367-410.Elections. Direct democracy. Median voter theorem. Electoral competition of two parties for deterministic and stochastic voting. Games in the normal form: pure-strategy Nash equilibria and their existence. Swing voters. A test of the role of referendum. Electoral rules and tactical redistribution.*** McCarty, Meirowitz (2007) Ch. 5.1-5.3* Mueller (2003) Ch. 11, 12.1-12.2, 21.2* Myerson, R.B. (1993) Incentives to Cultivate Favored Minorities Under Alternative Electoral Systems, American Political Science Review 87 (4), 856-869.Duggan, J. (2006) Candidate Objectives and Electoral Equilibrium, Handbook, Ch. 4 Contests for policy rent. Coase theorem and (ir)relevance of allocation of political power. Rent-seeking. Contest success functions and contest design: general results for logit-form and all-pay auction. Contests with policy commitments. Mixed-strategies. Dominance. Mixed-strategy Nash equilibria. The long-term effects of consolidation on the number and activities of interest groups. Lobbying by the financial industry and mortgage crisis. Measuring returns from rent-seeking. Asymmetric lobbying and soft-budget constraints. Bailouts of sunset industries. Political determinants of shareholder protection (stakeholder vs. shareholder society). Regulation or taxes. Determinants of exchange rate regimes.*** McCarty, Meirowitz (2007) Ch. 5.4-5.7, 5.10*** Mueller (2003) Ch. 15*** Winden, F. (2003) Interest Group Behavior and Influence. In Rowley, C.K., and Schneider, F. (eds.), The Encyclopedia of Public Choice, Springer US, 118-129.* Che, Y., and Gale, I.L. (1998) Caps on Political Lobbying. American Economic Review 88 (3): 643-651.* Münster, J. (2006) Lobbying Contests with Endogenous Policy Proposals. Economics & Politics 18(3): 389-397.Del Rosal, I. (2011) The Empirical Measurement of Rent-Seeking Costs. Journal of Economic Surveys 25(2): 298-325.Broz, J.L., Frieden, J.A. (2006) The Political Economy of Exchange Rate Regimes, Handbook, Ch. 32. Coalitional decision-making. Coalitional fiscal policies and their electoral determinants. Electoral systems and public spending. Excessive deficits, excessive spending and tragedy of budgetary commons. The role of decision-making fragmentation. National procedural fiscal rules. Games in the extensive form. Perfect and imperfect information. Dynamic games of complete but imperfect information. Backward induction. Subgame-perfect equilibrium. Forward induction. Non-cooperative bargaining. Structure-induced equilibrium. Coordinated vs. sequential budget process. Leviathan hypothesis. Legislative bargaining and budgeting.*** McCarty, Meirowitz (2007) Ch. 7.1-7.5, 7.8** Von Hagen, J. (2006) Political Economy of Fiscal Institutions, Handbook, Ch. 26Diermeier, D. (2006) Coalitional Government, Handbook, Ch. 9Persson, T., Tabellini, G. (2006) Electoral Systems and Economic Policy, Handbook, Ch. 40 Reforms. Regime inertia and regime traps. Political barriers to development. Uncertainty over types. Bayesian games. Bayesian equilibria. Waiting games.  Electoral risks in the formulation of electoral reform platforms. Electoral predictions through prediction markets and economic voting: misery index. Crisis bargaining and reforms. War of attrition in debt stabilization.*** McCarty, Meirowitz (2007) Ch. 6.1-6.2, 6.7-6.8, 10.5-10.7Acemoglu, D., Robinson, J. (2006) Paths of Economic and Political Development, Handbook, Ch. 37Acemoglu, D. (2011) Theory, General Equilibrium, and Political Economy in Development Economics, Journal of Economic Perspectives 24 (3), 17-32Wren, A. (2006) Comparative Perspectives on the Role of the State in the Economy, Handbook, Ch. 35 Lobbying. Dynamic games of incomplete information. Perfect Bayesian equilibria. Strategic communication. Informational rent-seeking. Strategic information transmission. Signaling. Cheap talk and persuasion. Lobbying as search. Mandatory disclosure.*** McCarty, Meirowitz (2007) Ch. 8.1-8.2, 8.5*** Gregor, M. (2011) Corporate lobbying: recent theory and evidence, mimeo.** Grossman, Helpman (2001) Ch. 4.1-4.2, 5Ansolabehere, S., de Figueiredo, J.M., and Snyder, J.M. (2003) Why is There so Little Money in U.S. Politics? Journal of Economic Perspectives 17(1): 105-130.Kamenica, E., Gentzkow, M. (2011) Bayeasian Persuasion. American Economic Review, forthcoming.

Literatura

Grossman, G.M., Helpman, E. (2001) Special Interest Politics. MIT PressMcCarty, N., Meirowitz, A. (2007) Political Game Theory. Cambridge University PressMueller, D. (2003) Public Choice III. Cambridge University PressRasmusen, E. (2006) Games and Information, 4th edition. Wiley-BlackwellWeingast, B., Wittman, D. (2006) Oxford Handbook of Political Economy. Oxford University Press

Garant

PhDr. Martin Gregor, Ph.D.

Vyučující

PhDr. Martin Gregor, Ph.D.